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AS COMPONENTS OF DEFINITIONS
1.1. It is assumed that basic and also the most adequate way of meaning
explanation of lexical units consists in their defining. The notion of defini
tion can be used in its broader or narrower sense. It is possible to treat each
semantic characteristic of a given lexical unit as its definition in the broader
sense of the term. However, if one wants a definition to be precise, exhaus
tive and methodologically correct then it should be subjected to stronger
conditions.
First of all, it is necessary to define meaning of lexical units by means of
the semantic metalanguage whose vocabulary is a part of a natural language
and is composed of semantically prime and hence indefinable expressions.
* Moreover, it is assumed that internal structure of an ideal definition satisfies
the following conditions:
(a) Definiens is a sequence of lexical units belonging to the above
mentioned vocabulary of the semantic metalanguage. The units are connected
according to the grammatical rules of the language to which they belong.
IDefiniens is a sequence synonymuos to definiendum and it is possible to
justify the truthfulness of such a hypothesis.
(c) Definition presents semantic relations between the unit to be ex
plained and the other ones used in a given definiens. Semantic relations are
warranted by virtue of conventions of a given natural language as a system
of signs. Hence an ideal definition presents exclusively conventional interde
pendences between lexical units.
1.2. By semantic conventions I mean an interdependence between the
meanings of natural language expressions, belonging to the language system
and thus known to the same degree to all the native users of the language. The
interdependence is based on the fact that each user of the language is willing
to use expressions A and B in such a way that they will not be contradictory
to each other. The willingness of such an application oflanguage expressions
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is due to the fact that each user of a language knows that all the others are
willing to use the same expressions in a not contradictory way too and that
they will do it in order to understand each other. Thus each user of English
knows that there are, inter alia, the following interdependences between the
expressions a widow and a woman, a dachshund and a dog, to chop and
to devide: if somebody is a widow, then she is a woman, if something is a
dachshund, then it is a dog, if somebody chops something with something,
then he devides it into parts. Hence, each user of English is willing to use
the expressions a widow, a dachshund and to chop in such a way that they
would be not contradictory with the interdependences mentioned above.
Му рreliminary concept of semantic convention was presented in detail
in one of the earlier works (cf. Grochowski 1988a).
1.3. On the basis of the accepted assumptions one can say that adequate
definitions ought to be such tautological formulae in which the shapes of
definiendum and definiens are not identical. In other words, definitions ought
to be necessarily true sentences, that is, analytic ones. Consequently, as a
result of denying such definitions self-contradictory sentences ought to arise.
An ideal definition satisfies the so-called postulate of substitution, that
is to say, it is possible to replace a given lexical unit by its definiens in any
context without violation of its correctness and without any change in its
meaning.
If a given definition satisfies all the above-mentioned conditions, then it
can be called an objective complete one. A lexical unit having a function of
definiendum in the objective definition, as opposed to the metalinguistic one,
is treated as an extralinguistic object, not a language expression.
2. Оn the basis of preliminary semantic analysis of the chosen lexical
units belonging to different classes one can state without difficulty that only
a certain subset of lexical units is describable by means of the objective com
plete definitions. There are probably at least four main reasons of this fact.
Pirstly, it is very difficult in many cases to justify truthfulness of hy
potheses that relation ofsynonymy between the units, which are defined, and
the sequences of the order units does occur.
Secondly, there are difficulties in finding out a clear boundary line be
tween semantic and extralinguistic coventions and consequently between the
meanings of language objects and states of affairs denoted by them.
Thirdly, in natural languages there are lexical units whose meanings are
cognizаble not only on the basis of intralinguistic conventions but also as a
result of a contact between expressions and extralinguistic object or states of
affairs. This point will be considered below.
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Fourthly, in each natural language meaningless lexical units surely exist,
that is units not having a communicative function in utterances. Therefore
it is natural that one cannot ascribe any semantic representation to the units
and thus they are describable only in accordance with pragmatic or gram
natical conventions. The question of meaningless units was considered in one
of my earlier works (cf. Grochowski 1990).
Since objective complete definitions can be applied to semantic descrip
tions only in a limited scope it is inevitable to employ also other methods to
explain meanings of lexical units. Farther on I present a few other types of
definitions.
3.1. It appears that there are at least two relevant premises apart from
the considered ones up to here which one should take into account when one
makes inquiries about adequate ways of defining.
Pirstly, there is relation of hyponymy between each meaningfull lexical
unit and at least one of the other lexical units. This follows from the state
ment that one can find out hyperonyms of the all meaningfull units except
the semantically prime ones. Hyperonyms are useful for forming objective
partial definitions.
Secondly, there is a possibility of presenting the most typical, or at least
adequate, ways of using each lexical unit. Such a presentation can consist in
quotation of a given unit in its verbal context or in ascription of a unit to a
given object.
3.2. The first premise requires no additional comments. The essential
difference between the objective complete definition and the objective partial
one consists in lack ofrelation ofsynonymy in the partial definition. Therefore
it does not satisfy the postulate of substitution.
Оn the basis of second premise one can form, among others, such a
metalinguistic definition that has an analogous function to a postulational
definition known in formal logic (cf. Ajdukiewicz 1974: 79-82, 1985: II,
231-232). It will be called here a metalinguistic postulational definition. A
procedure of explanation by means of such a definition is limited to referring
to the unit x to be explained, for example an ambiguous one, the following
descriptions: 1. expression having the meaning a when is used in the following
exemplary sentences, 2. expression having the meaning b when is used in the
following exemplary sentences. After that appropriate sentences are quoted.
Descriptions of that kind are mentioned by A. Boguslawski (1988: 70,
144) among the types of dictionary semantic informations which he proposed.
In "Syntax of polypredicative expressions’ (cf. Grochowski 1984) I applied
the method under consideration to the semantic analysis of some conjuctions
and prepositions (without using the above-mentioned terminology).
The metalinguistic postulational definition has on the one hand the least
force of explanation but on the other hand it warrants truthfulness of the
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description. It can be applied exclusively when the investigator is not able
to explain a given unit even by means of its hyperonyms. Situations of that
kind are not only theoretically possible but also practically unavoidable when
one tries to define, for example, some interjections or particles.
3.3. On the basis of the second premise of semantic descriptions one can
form also ostensive definitions, called iconographic ones. The procedure of
defining by means of them consists in pointing to a certain object or state of
affairs (or their picture) and referring to it, for example, the following verbal
formulae: "This is x.” or “When people see (hear, ...) things (events) like
these they can say: this is x.” In place of x one should use such a lexical unit
that can be truthfully said about a given object or event. For example, I point
at the window or a something green or somebody's cough at the moment and
I say: “when people see (hear) things (events) like these they can say: this is
a window (green, a cough)”.
Оstensive definitions can be applied only to description of units denoting
objects and states of affairs which are perceptible by means of one's senses.
The idea of the ostensive definitions is realized in some semantic works
(cf. Wierzbicka 1985) and dictionaries (cf. Bogustavski 1983, Bondy
—Lempicka, Arct 1957, Hornby 1974, Larousse 1917, Longman 1978) in such
a way that pictures of objects are presented with captions under them. They
can serve practically as an invaluable help in recognition of typical objects
denoted by some lexical units and they are useful especially for people learn
ing a foreign language. However, it is impossible to identify the pictures of
objects with semantic representation of the lexical units under consideration.
3.4. The concept of ostensive definitions is based on the assumption
that people become acquainted with some notions as a result of a contact
between their shapes and appropriate objects and states of affairs. This is
why a possibility to ascribe truthfully definite expression to object of a definite
type exists. This follows from language conventions of reference, that is to
say, from interdependences between language expressions and extralinguistic
objects which belong to the language system and thus are known to the users
of the language. A false sentence arises as a result of behaviour incompatible
with language convention of reference. If someone uses, for example, the
expression an elephant in order to ascribe it to a lamp then he behaves himself
out of accord with such a convention.
The notion of language conventions of reference was explained in one of
my earlier papers and in this connection it will not be considered here (cf.
Grochowski 1988a).
4.1. Оn the basis of the previous analysis of ostensive definitions and
also of preliminary accessible knowledge of the semantic system of natural
languages it is possible to formulate the hypothesis that there are no lexical
units that one should describe by means of ostensive definition but cannot
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describe in any other way. It seems to me that it is possible and in many
cases even necessary to combine the concept of ostensive definitions with the
method of explaining by means of hyperonyms. In this connection objective
definitions containing quotation of the unit to be explained are considered
farther on. In these situations the units are used in the material supposition.
If one wants to assign a semantic representation of a given unit it is
matter of course that, as a rule, one tries to form its objective complete
definition which satisfies the conditions mentioned at the beginning of the
paper. If the unit to be explained refers to a commonly known object or
state of affairs then very often investigators make efforts to present all the
typical features ofthe object or state of affairs denoted by the unit by means of
definition. A definition of an extralinguistic object or a state of affairs known
to somebody or at least imaginable does arise instead of semantic definition of
lexical unit as a result of such an analysis. If one tries afterwards to eliminate
all the components subsequent exclusively to the knowledge of extralinguistic
reality from such a definition, then it appears that it is difficult to form a
definition synonymous to a given unit on the basis of the set of undisputable
semantic components of the unit. Hence, partial definitions in most cases
arise.
Неге аге (he following preliminary objective definitions of the units a
bed, a glass, X has a cough, an hour.
Bed — it is a thing which was made for people in order that they can
lie on it.
Glass — it is a thing which was made for people in order that they can
drink something from it.
Х has a cough—something happens in X's body and because of that X
makes sounds.
Ноur — it is a unit of time measure.
The idea of the last definition is taken from Bednarek's paper; cf.
Bednarek 1990.
4.2. One can state without hesitation that the definitions proposed above
contain hyperonyms of units which are explained and that the relation of
synonymy is not communicated there. It is possible to justify the statements
by the method of inquiring about contradiction.
Moreover, there is an additional argument for the fact that the relation
of synonymy is not communicated in the definitions.
If someone wants to define the units which are semantically related but
not synonymous to the explained ones, for example, such units as a a cough,
a mug, Х has a hiccup, a minute, and if someone tries to eliminate from such
definitions all the components subsequent to the knowledge of extralinguistic
reality and to limit the scopes of the definitions to undisputable semantic
components of the units, then it appears that the definitions formed in such
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a way are probably identical to the above-presented ones. Such results of the
analysis are not convincing. Non-contradictory sentences can be formed in
order to prove this, compare for example: - ;
This thing was made for people in order that they can lie on it but it is
not a bed.
This thing was made for people in order that they can drink something
from it but it is not a glass.
Something happens in X's body and because of that X makes sounds but
Х has not a cough.
It is a unit of time measure but it is not an hour.
Since people can communicate successfully with each other by means of
the units under consideration and they do not use interchangeably the units
making a given pair (because they would not be able to understand each
other) one should reject the hypothesis that a relation of synonymy between
the above-mentioned units does occur. If the idea concerning the possibility
of combining semantic features and those which follow from knowledge of the
world is rejected too, then one ought to consider two theoretically possible
solutions of the problem.
The first one consists in acceptance of the opinion that units which have
no full meaning but only partial ones exist in natural languages.
The second solution is grounded on the assumption that, apart from
semantic conventions, other linguistic conventions exist which influence the
understanding of some expressions and their truthfull application as well.
It seems that the first solution is intuitively unconvincing, though it was
proposed in one of my earlier works (cf. Grochowski 1988b). Therefore only
the second one will be taken into account here.
4.3. One should accept the assumption that language conventions of ref
erence exist and that definite consequences which were earlier spoken about
follow from it. On the basis of this assumption one can complete definitions
ofthe notions, which are also ostensively cognizаble, by means of components
containing the names of the appropriate notions, that is to say, the expres
sions used in the material supposition. Vicious circle does not arise since the
definitions of the units are the objective ones. In this connection I propose
the following preliminary objective definitions containing quotations for four
lexical units which were defined above with the aid of their hyperonyms.
Bed — it is a thing which was made for people in order that they can
lie on it and which can be spoken about "bed”.
Glass — it is a thing which was made for people in order that they can
drink something from it and which can be spoken about "glass”.
Х has a cough — something happens in X's body and because of that X
makes sounds which can be spoken about “cough”.
Ноur — it is a unit of time measure called “hour”.
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In definitions of the above-presented type the relation of synonymy be
tween definiens and definiendum does occur.
5.1. The application of the objective definitions containing quotation is
not a new procedure of meaning explanation. It was applied in many semantic
works, for example, by Wierzbicka (1972, 1991) for defining the names of
months and days of week, the names of colours, the names of natural and
cultural kinds, such as dog and bread, by Boguslavski (1988) for defining
the names of human titles that is denominations confered on people, such as
colonel, professor or dean, by Bednarek (1990, 1991) for defining the names
of measure units and numeral expressions, and also by me (cf. Grochowski
1988а, 1991) for defining some names of human artefacts and some names of
sounds.
It is unforeseeable in advance without detailed empirical studies what can
be a scope of application of the objective definitions containing quotation.
Nevertheless, on the basis of the previous research one can state without
hesitation that it is unavoidable to apply definitions of that type in semantics.
5.2. Remarks presented in the paper concerning several types of def
initions which do not satisfy conditions of an ideal definition, namely the
objective complete one, are treated exclusively as proposals belonging to the
domain of methodology of lexical semantics. A possibility of application of
such definitions to monolingual dictionaries requires separate examinations.
They ought to be preceded by decisions concerning two general questions first
of all.
Firstly, it is necessary to establish a general concept of meaning expla
nation in a given dictionary which ought to answer its purpose. Оne should
assume that different rules are standing, for example, in scientific dictionary
and in a popular one.
Secondly, for recognition of semantic system of a given natural language,
not for lexicographic purpose, it is necessary to establish at first a register
of foreseeable types of definitions and register of semantic classes of lexical
units which can be explained by means of them.
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Аутор у овом чланку образлаже тезу да се помоћу синонимичних
дефиниција не могу објаснити значења свих врста лексичких јединица.
На основу претпоставки (а) да свака лексичка јединица која нешто значи
представља хипоним бар једне друге јединице и (б) да постоји могућност
презентације адекватног начина употребе сваке јединице (путем њеног
навођења или одређивања њене денотације), аутор разликује следеће
типове дефиниција: (1) парцијалне предметне, (2) метајезичке помоћу
постулата, (3) остензивне (иконографске) и (4) предметне уз навођење. Он,
даље, указује на потребу увођења предметних дефиниција које садрже како
хипероним лексичке јединице која се дефинише, тако и њу саму, а онда
утврђује унутрашњу структуру и принципе грађења таквих дефиниција.
